Foreign policy vision of the Turkish religious right: from national view to justice and development party by Hakan Koni,
69 
International Journal of West Asian Studies 
Vol. 3 No. 1, 2011 (pp 69 - 86) 
 
 
Foreign Policy Vision of the Turkish Religious Right:  From National View 
to Justice and Development Party 
 
Hakan Köni 
hkoni@bilkent.edu.tr 
Department of Political Science 
Bilkent University  
 
Abstract 
 
This article explores the transformation of the Turkish religious right in its view to the major 
goals and orientation of Turkish foreign policy from National View parties to the Justice and 
Development Party. The main argument of the paper is that foreign policy vision of Turkish 
religious right has shifted from a substantially cultural to a pragmatist and rational one. While 
the National View parties were opposed to develop relations with the West and were rather in 
favour of integration with the Muslim countries of the Middle East, the Justice and 
Development Party is motivated to integrate with the West and the East at the same time in 
search of achieving advanced political, economic and social institutions at home and in 
Turkey’s neighbourhood. It is a major goal of the Justice and Development Party to ensure 
Turkey’s membership to the EU which was formerly identified by the National View as a 
union of Christian states. The Justice and Development Party is also in cooperation with the 
USA in its goal to institute more democratic and peaceful regimes in the Middle East. While 
trying to promote contemporary political institutions in the Middle East, the Justice and 
Development Party is also in search of greater cooperation and partnership in economic, 
diplomatic and cultural terms. Behind this seemingly contradictory attitude lies the belief on 
the part of the Justice and Development Party deputies that democracy, human rights, rule of 
law, good governance are indisputable ideals of 21st century politics and that they are not in 
conflict with different cultural values enjoyed by the world community. The Justice and 
Development Party endeavours to make Turkey a centre country, a regional and global power, 
an advanced democracy and a respectable member of the international community.   
 
Keywords: National View, Justice and Development Party, Foreign Policy, Middle East, 
European Union, USA 
 
Abstrak 
Artikel ini meneroka transformasi pandangan parti agama berhaluan kanan kepada matlamat 
dan orientasi dasar luar Negara Turki dari Parti Pandangan Nasional kepada Parti Keadilan 
dan Pembangunan. Hujah utama artikel ini ialah visi dasar luar parti agama berhaluan kanan 
telah berubah daripada berasaskan budaya kepada pandangan yang pragmatik dan rasional.  
Manakala parti-parti National View tidak bersetuju untuk membina hubungan dengan Barat, 
sebaliknya ingin berintegrasi dengan Negara-negara Timur Tengah, Parti Keadilan dan 
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Pembangunan pula bermotivasi untuk bersatu dengan Barat dan Timur,  pada masa sama 
mencapai institusi politik, ekonomi dan sosial di negara sendiri dan juga Negara jiran. Adalah 
suatu matlamat penting Parti Keadilan dan Pembangunan  untuk menjamin keanggotaan Turki 
di dalam EU yang pernah dikenal pasti oleh Parti Pandangan Nasional sebagai sebuah 
kesatuan Negara-negara Kristian.  Parti Keadilan dan Pembangunan adalah juga bekerjasama 
dengan Amerika Syarikat dalam usahanya untuk menggalakkan rejim yang lebih demokratik 
dan aman di Timur Tengah. Sambil berusaha untuk mempromosi politik semasa di Timur 
Tengah, Parti Keadilan dan Pembangunan juga berusaha mencari kerjasama yang lebih luas 
dan rakan dalam ekonomi, diplomatik dan budaya. Di belakang sikap yang nampaknya 
bercanggah terletak kepercayaan pada anggota Parlimen Parti Keadilan dan Pembangunan 
bahawa demokrasi, hak asasi manusia, pemerintahan berasaskan undang-undang, tadbir urus 
yang baik adalah ideal politik abad ke  21 yang tidak boleh dinafikan dan ia tidak bercanggah 
dengan nilai budaya yang berbeza yang dinikmati oleh masyarakat dunia. Parti Keadilan dan 
Pembangunan berusaha untuk menjadikan Turki sebuah negara pertengahan, sebuah kuasa 
serantau dan dunia, sebuah demokrasi yang maju dan sebuah anggota antarabangsa yang 
dihormati. 
 
Kata kunci: Pandangan Nasional, Parti Keadilan dan Pembangunan, Dasar Luar, Timur 
Tengah, Kesatuan Eropah, Amerika Syarikat. 
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1. Introduction 
This article is assigned to the exploration of the change in party program and policies of 
Turkish religious right concerning foreign policy from the National View parties to the Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: AKP). National View parties of 1970s, 
80s and 90s display a strong similarity in their adoption of a substantially cultural foreign 
policy view that foresaw the unity and integrity of Muslim nations, on one hand, and 
minimization of relations with the west on the other. The National View movement had a 
negative view of the West with a conception that it was heavily infused with elements of 
Judeo-Christian traditions adversarial to Islam and the Muslims. While it was necessary to 
maintain links with the west for the import of elements of material culture such as science and 
technology, Turkey had to turn its face to the Muslim Middle East for diplomatic, political, 
economic and social integration and cooperation.  
The foreign policy line of the Justice and Development Party, however, is not based on a 
dichotomy of East-West described in cultural terms. The party deems all types of integration 
and links with the west as a precondition for Turkey’s development and progress. It has the 
goal to further improve Turkey’s ties with the West with its campaign to establish deeper and 
firmer links let it be the UN, EU, NATO, or individual states. Yet the party pledges to further 
develop Turkey’s relations with Middle Eastern countries as well for service to Turkey’s 
national interests and for regional and global peace, but also as a part of our membership to a 
common historical and cultural legacy with the Middle Eastern countries. Turkey’s social and 
cultural ties with the East are not considered as an impediment to its relations with the West. 
The party assumes an assertively multipartite, multidimensional and pragmatic foreign policy 
vision aiming to minimize problems with neighbour states and believing in the significance of 
democracy, rule of law, human rights and other basic principles of universal rights and values 
as the parameters of its foreign policy orientation.1 
 
2. The National View Movement     
 
The main goal of the National View movement in foreign policy was explained by Necmettin 
Erbakan as promotion of peace and justice among nations and strengthening our relations with 
our current links with a regional and global perspective. The National View movement vowed 
to institute a stable, permanent, national, independent and honourable foreign policy. In 
Turkey’s relations with neighbouring countries, development of relations with the Middle 
Eastern countries was given particular importance with a view that such a policy would be in 
best service to the interests of the country and also that this was a part of our common cultural 
and historical heritage with other Muslim nations. We were the parties of a historical Islamic 
                                                            
1 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (tr. Strategic Analysis), 2009, p. 501; “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı (tr. 
Turkey Must Be A Centre Country),” Radikal, February 26, 2004. 
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civilization that could not have been denied in shaping our foreign policy nor our domestic 
politics.2  
 
It was a necessity of our sovereignty to institute a domestic and foreign policy 
independent from the concerns of other actors in our country. Turkey’s economic ties with 
western international organizations such as IMF and the World Bank were not in the interests 
of the country. They were rather damaging our sovereignty. Turkey could not have been a tool 
for the interests of other countries.3   
The notion of justice among nations mentioned in the beginning was developed to 
combat remnants of colonialism and imperialism something which countries with cultural and 
historical bonds to Turkey were still struggling against. Turkish Muslim nations of the Soviet 
Union were imposed to live under such a rule. And Israel was similarly a Western agent in the 
Middle East targeting our holy Islamic lands and the motherland of brother Palestinian Arabs. 
The movement would defend the rights of these nations in international platforms in line with 
provisions of national and international protocols on human rights and freedoms.4  
Fight against injustice and oppression among nations was an honourable character of 
our glorious history long before the popularization of such international discourses 
incorporated by the United Nations most commonly. The Ottoman Empire, for instance, had 
united many nations under its sovereignty but it had never resembled its contemporary 
examples of western imperialism which were characterized with colonialism and exploitation 
in opposition to teachings of our Islamic heritage. As a continuity of this tradition, the 
National View movement would not support contemporary examples of the imperialist 
practice. The imperialist states and their proxies in the Middle East were determined to 
prevent Turkey from becoming a powerful state and its mission of justice and peace in the 
Middle East.5 
The view of the movement on Cyprus issue was a reflection of this thinking. The 
peace operation executed after the approval of the Turkish Grand National Assembly with 
unanimity of votes was praised as a military victory achieved by Turkish Armed Forces. The 
operation was necessary to stop the bloodshed, massacres and oppressions that the neglected 
Turkish community suffered in the Island for decades. It was an honour on the party of the 
National Salvation Party to lead the Cyprus War in coalition with Bülent Ecevit’s Republican 
People’s Party. The party was devoted to defend the rights of the Turkish people in the Island 
and it would never forsake the victory gained on the battleground by the bloods of the 
martyrs. The diplomatic cause would be pursued in international political champers 
accordingly. The party considered the support of Arab countries to Turkey’s Cyprus cause in 
                                                            
2 Necmettin Erbakan, Milli Görüş (tr. National View), 1975, pp. 229-30; Party Program of the National Order 
Party, Articles 98, 100; Party Program of the National Salvation Party, Articles 41, 42, 43; Party Program of 
the Welfare Party, Article 28.  
3 Ahmet Tekdal, “Opening Speech,” First Grand Congress of the Welfare Party, June 30, 1985. 
4 Necmettin Erbakan, 1975, pp. 229-30; Party Program of the National Order Party, Articles 98, 99, 100; Party 
Program of the National Salvation Party, Articles 41, 42, 43; Party Program of the Welfare Party, Article 28. 
5 Ahmet Tekdal, June 30, 1985. 
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the UN as a diplomatic victory assured by the policies of National Salvation Party to develop 
relations with Middle Eastern countries.6    
The view of the movement on Turkey’s bidding for entrance to Customs Union as a 
part of the European Economic Community was very much negative. It was because the 
European Economic Community was a Christian club and a contemporary version of western 
imperialism. Membership to the EU would be a denial of our glorious history and culture 
which was built as a result of centuries of old struggles against the west and the things it 
defends. The idea of Customs Union was introduced in Roman Catholic Congress before the 
negotiation of the Treaty of Rome by three leading catholic prime ministers of the time De 
Gasperi, Schuman, and Adenauer. By uniting centuries of warring Christian states, the 
Community would terminate bloodshed among Christians, provide them with a scheme for 
greater economic development, and in our case it would weaken our domestic economy and 
render us politically and economically dependent on the West. The agreement for Customs 
Union would kill Turkey’s infant industry before it was able to match with its European rivals. 
The major source of the motivation of the Community was their membership to Judeo-
Christian-Greek tradition characterized with enmity against the Orient and demolition of the 
Islamic civilization.7 Western international organizations were a set of concerted tools for the 
right of the might, for the exploitation of developing and poor countries. They were thus 
against Turkey’s mission of civilization to institute justice and observe the right of the 
nations.8 
Parties and groups defending Turkey’s membership to the EEC were never considering 
social and cultural consequences of such an action. They had understood modernization as 
westernization in cultural terms rather than importation of science and technology developed 
by the West. The religious motivation of the Community was not a source of trouble for them 
because they were interpreting secularism as enmity against religion. European Economic 
Community was not just an economic organization. It had the membership of six catholic 
countries with overarching political, social, cultural and ideological goals based on 
Christianity. Customs Union would damage our sovereignty over the lands that we had gained 
through the bloods of our martyrs.9  
There were some other pitfalls of the Community too. It had three main organs 
including a council, a commission and a court of Justice. With increasing membership of 
other Christian European countries, Turkey’s membership in this organization would make it 
subject to the decisions of those other countries as Turkey would be in the minority. 
Particularly in Turkey’s Cyprus Peace Operation, the EEC would compel Turkey to backslide 
in violation of the rights of the Turks living in the Island. The European Economic 
Community was envisaging permanent membership from all countries with an intention to 
melt all member countries in a single pot of European civilization that contradicts Turkey’s 
                                                            
6 Necmettin Erbakan, 1975, pp. 233-4.  
7 Ibid., pp. 235-50, 254-264; Necmettin Erbakan, Adil Ekonomik Düzen (tr. Just Economic Order), 1991, p. 90. 
8 Necmettin Erbakan, 1991, p. 93. 
9 Necmettin Erbakan, 1975, pp. 255-7. 
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historical, cultural and social structure. The movement would not let Turkey melt in 
Christianity.10  
According to another scenario, the European Economic Community was an invention 
of Jewish bourgeoisie who wanted to reintegrate Germany into world economy to become an 
instrument for the development of Jewish capital. In addition to that, Jewish community and 
capital had suffered a lot from interstate rivalry and particularly the Second World War. 
According to the Jewish intellectuals, the way to progress was lying behind unity of European 
states with fluidity in borders and peace and stability among Christian states so that they 
would easily be able to transfer funds and commodity over the borders and protect their 
population from potential threats while also preparing the political and economic ground for 
the establishment of the Great Israel. For the National View, even the circulation of Jewish 
capital on itself was apprehensible because its major principle of revenue was interest and 
exploitation.11  
The origins of this Jewish conspiracy were going back to a famous Zionist Theodor 
Herzl who had lived in Wien a hundred years ago known as the intellectual father of Israel. 
Theodor Herzl had drawn borders of a Great Israel state that would be established in the 
future on the lands stretching between inland Egypt and Turkey as they claimed that they were 
promised in the distorted Old Testament. This state would be headquartering a Jewish 
dominion that would cover the entire world. His statute being put in today’s Israeli 
parliament, Theodor Herzl was preparing political, economic and diplomatic bases of this 
future dream. The Jewish intellectuals were always around the Pope trying to persuade him to 
unite Christian states in form of such a confederation.12  
The Zionists wanted Turkey to become a member of the Community because they 
knew that Turkish society and culture would melt in a union of Christian states. In addition, 
Turkey would be exploited economically as it was the Jews that held the main portions of 
capital in Europe. The Europe would serve them as civil servants while the Turks were needed 
for cheap labour.  And lastly, the Customs Union agreement was making it possible for 
citizens of member states to buy real estate in other member countries. The Jews would be 
facilitated to buy the lands that they were planning to incorporate in their lands in the future.13  
Turkey had to establish a Customs Union with Muslim states rather. Establishment of 
such a Union with Muslim nations with whom we shared a common historical and cultural 
legacy would serve to Turkey’s economic interests in the future and would be safer. We were 
not western. We were not European. Our history was written over a centuries-old struggle 
between Islam and Europe. Turkey’s bidding for EU would not destroy this heritage.14  
The generality of Muslim nations in the Middle East were oil producing rich countries 
with lack of industrial development for production of manufacturing goods. If we were able to 
                                                            
10 Necmettin Erbakan, 1975, pp. 235-50, 254-264. 
11 Ibid., pp. 250-4. 
12 Id.   
13 Id.   
14 Necmettin Erbakan, Türkiye’nin Temel Meseleleri (tr. Turkey’s Major Issues), p. 35. 
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direct the earnings that they gained through the sale of oil, that would contribute to our 
economy substantially to be used in the development of an export-oriented domestic 
industry.15   
The view of the movement on entrance to the EU and active membership to the NATO 
was a little bit altered with the establishment of the Welfare Party. NATO membership was in 
the interests of Turkey as a part of Turkey’s wider security concerns against the Soviet threat 
and communism, and therefore it was necessary to keep the ties with the NATO alliance. It 
was also possible to become a member of the EU as long as it would remain as an economic 
entity ensuring equal rights and benefits to member states. But the party was opposed to EU if 
it was to damage our sovereignty by making Turkey a province of a single European state 
which was planned for the future.16   
To recap the foreign policy orientation of the National View movement, it is observed 
that since its entrance into Turkish political life with National Order Party in 1969, it has 
based its party program on a dichotomy of East-West. The western civilization was deemed as 
intrinsically rooted in Judeo-Christian tradition as an adversary of Islamic civilization in 
retrospect and it was characterized with materialism, oppression and imperialism. The 
materialism that came by western civilization was related with the denial of religion and 
morality in contemporary life. The oppression and imperialism that the west defended was 
related with colonialism, expansionism, exploitation and underdevelopment subjected to non-
western nations. In contrast to the western civilization, Islamic civilization was presenting an 
ideal international, political, social and economic system to its members. The National View 
has therefore been opposed to integration with the west in political, economic, social and 
cultural terms contrary to the decades old general orientation of the Turkish foreign policy. It 
sought to divert this orientation to the Islamic world instead to promote greater cooperation 
and solidarity among Muslim nations and establish alternative international organizations to 
those of western political and economic international organizations. 
More specifically, the National View objected to Turkey’s bidding for membership to 
European Economic Community and Customs Union as well as its membership to NATO and 
UN. Accordingly, Turkey’s integration with the west would damage its sovereignty, cultural 
identity and economic development. They therefore advocated the institution of their 
alternatives in the Islamic world such as an Islamic Common Market, Islamic NATO, Islamic 
UN, Islamic UNESCO and Islamic currency.  
The National View has stably defended an anti-Israeli foreign policy. Israel was 
observed as a foot of the west in the Islamic world with its expansionist and oppressive 
policies directed to the Palestinians particularly but with future goals expanding over Syria, 
Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. It had to be opposed, encountered and defeated. The tone of Turkey’s 
relations with Israel was used as leverage by the west for economic, diplomatic, political and 
military assistance from the west. They were all to be deemed as one and Turkey must not 
have been tricked with imperialist games.     
 
                                                            
15 Necmettin Erbakan, 1975, pp. 265-70; Party Program of the National Order Party, Article 100.  
16 Ahmet Tekdal, June 30, 1985.,   
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3. JD Party’s Foreign Policy 
 
It is observed that foreign policy orientation of Turkish religious right has changed 
substantially from National View parties to Justice and Development Party. The oppositional 
posture against cooperation and integration with western political, economic and cultural 
institutions and search for their alternatives in the Islamic world has been totally abandoned. 
Turkey’s cultural and historical ties with the Muslim world are respected, but the content of 
relations with the Middle East is augmented with a group of other political and economic 
concerns. While trying to carry out the mission of the earlier parties to develop political and 
economic relations with the Middle East, the AKP also serves as a representative of the west 
to campaign for the necessity to institute political and social reforms for the prevalence of 
democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance in the region. Though the National 
View parties were not against such standards, they were more concerned with attaining some 
Islamic ideals. Contrary to the denial of the National View to integrate with the west with a 
perception that the west was trying to undermine our existence, the AKP has developed a 
vision of world community with which Turkey has to establish rooted links in political, 
economic and diplomatic terms let it be the UN, EU, NATO or individual states.   
 
This paradigmatic change in the foreign policy orientation of Turkish religious right is 
attributed to the role of Ahmet Davutoğlu in the foreign policy team of the AKP first as a chief 
foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and then to Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül and his later appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs in May 
2009. Davutoğlu has introduced a number of goals and policy concerns to be adapted by the 
AKP Government in Turkey’s relations with regional and global actors. Accordingly, Turkey 
must firstly minimize its problems with neighbouring countries and global political powers to 
zero. Secondly, Turkey must assume a multidimensional and multipartite foreign policy view 
by considering all political, diplomatic, economic, social and legal consequences of particular 
policies. In doing this, Turkey has to promote and make use of the collective action of the 
international community in the entities of regional and global international organizations as 
well as individual actors. Thirdly, the commonly used metaphorical expression about Turkey 
as the bridge between the East and the West must be abandoned in favour of a Turkey as a 
centre country with the employment of its geopolitical, diplomatic and political assets. 
Fourthly, Turkish foreign policy must take into greater consideration such political and social 
issues as promoting democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms in addition to 
traditional foreign policy goals. Turkey stands as a model country for the Middle East for the 
institution of universal principles and values. Finally, Turkey must adopt a rhythmic and 
dynamic foreign policy in its fragile environment to match up with the challenges of the EU 
integration process, Turkish-US relations, Turkish-Israeli relations.17  
The AKP accepts contemporary legal and political paradigms like human rights, 
democratization and rule of law as universal values. Turkey’s prospective membership to EU 
                                                            
17 Ahmet Davutoğlu, 2009, p. 501; “Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı (Turkey Must Be A Centre Country),” 
February 26, 2004.   
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is considered as a great opportunity for domestic political, economic and social 
transformation. It was for this reason that the head of the AKP Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had 
speedily set out for visits to political leaders of EU members soon after the announcement of 
AKP’s electoral victory in November 2002. In his meeting with European leaders, Erdoğan 
delivered the importance his party attributes to EU membership and the willingness of his 
party to institute necessary reforms alongside the criterion indicated in Copenhagen (1993) 
and Helsinki (1999) summits which urge respect for and promotion of democracy, human 
rights, rule of law, minority rights and a functioning market economy to match up with the 
competitive European economy. This conditionality was repeated in December 2002 
Copenhagen Summit after the establishment of the AKP government. After the formation of 
the government, the AKP passed one by one the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th harmonization 
packages in the assembly in two years of a time until July 2004. Some of the reforms 
introduced by harmonization packages include improvement of the powers of civilian 
bureaucracy vis-à-vis the state elites, abolition of the death penalty, abolition of State Security 
Courts, greater freedom of expression and rights for organization. 18  The harmonization 
packages were deliberated by an EU commission in October 2004 and Turkey is declared as a 
candidate to start the process of negotiations for full membership.      
AKP Government’s biding for EU membership has brought some new controversies 
and developments in Cyprus issue. The EU accepted the Southern Cyprus Greek community 
into the union alongside 15 other new members as the representative of the entire Cyprus 
Island. A member of the Customs Union, Turkey was urged by the EU Additional Protocol 
adapted on June 13th 2005 to incorporate Southern Cyprus Greek Community in the Customs 
Union to indirectly make Turkey accept the Greek Community as the representative of the 
whole island. Turkey signed the Additional Protocol but added that the signing of the protocol 
does not mean the recognition of the Southern Cyprus as the representative of the entire 
Cyprus. The EU in return indicated that it recognizes only one state in the Island and that the 
protocol is a part of the Accession Partnership Document and Negotiating Framework ruled in 
October 2005 in Luxemburg. This view of the EU was repeated in November 2005 Progress 
Report too.19  
On January 2006, AKP Government declared its Cyprus plan according to which the 
additional protocol would be accepted only if the international isolation over Northern Cyprus 
Turkish Republic was abandoned. It is indicated in the plan that an agreement will be reached 
thereto only if the following four criteria are accepted which include the opening of Turkish 
harbours to Greek ships, opening of Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic harbours to 
international trade, supply of economic support to Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic by the 
EU and execution of the entire process in the body of the UN.20  
                                                            
18 Ali Resul Usul, “Helsinki’de Müzakerelere Türkiye-AB İlişkileri (tr. Turkish-EU Relations from Helsinki to 
Accession Negotiations),” in Zeynep Dağı, Ak Partili Yıllar (tr. Years with AKP), 2006, pp. 205-6; 
Burhanettin Duran, “The Justice and Development Party’s New Politics,” in Umit Cizre, Secular and Islamic 
Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, 2008,  p. 87. 
19 Ali Resul Usul, 2006, pp. 212-15. 
20 Ibid., pp. 209-12.  
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The Annan plan represents a very critical point in negotiations. In case of the approval 
of the plan by both communities, a federal state of Cyprus would be established with a 
negotiation similar to 1960 London and Zurich Agreements. The Annan plan foresaw the 
establishment of a Presidential Council of six members, two Turkish and four Greek 
distributed according to population. Three other non-voting members would be assigned 
according to population again. Secondly, the president and the vice-president would be 
selected by the Presidential Council one from each community to alternate in a period of five 
years. Thirdly, a bicameral legislature would be formed consisting of a Senate and a Chamber 
of Deputies. The Senate would have 48 members, 24 from each community and the Chamber 
of Deputies would have 48 members elected according to the population. Fourthly, a Supreme 
Court would be established with equal number of members from each community with an 
additional three foreign judges appointed by the Presidential Council.21    
The plan was fully supported by the AKP. The plan is presented to the public on April 
24th 2004 in a referendum by both communities with the result of 65% of yes votes by the 
Turkish community and 75% of no votes by the Greek community. In return for Northern 
Cyprus Turkish Republic’s approval of the plan and willingness for negotiation, the EU 
admitted the Regulations for Economic Assistance and Direct Trade for Northern Cyprus. But 
the economic assistance is not provided due to the opposition of the Greek community. The 
EU has then offered Northern Cyprus to give Maras to the Greeks, stop the sale of Greek 
properties in the North, and agree to the common usage of the Magusa harbour by both 
communities for the application of the Regulation, but the offer is rejected by the Northern 
Cyprus. The issue of economic assistance has been approved lastly by the EU Commission 
with a decision taken in June 2006.22 AKP government’s determination for EU membership, 
its willingness to sit around the negotiation table for the Cyprus for this matter, and its 
conciliatory attitude represents a very significant change in the course of Turkish religious 
right.         
The Middle East policy of the AKP similarly bears a good deal of changes from the 
foreign policy discourse of the Welfare Party. The Welfare Party defended the unity of Muslim 
countries in the Middle East on the base of cultural and historical legacy that the countries 
shared. The Muslim world would be united again under Turkish leadership like during the 
time of the Ottoman Empire to become a source of political and economic power. The Middle 
East discourse of the Welfare Party was very much propaganda without much of elaboration 
over the political, social and economic content of the unity. The locus of unity was a sense of 
reaction to the West and search for unity in Islam.  
The AKP, however, is bidding for becoming a regional and global power integrated 
with the East and the West at the same time. The party declares the importance of our 
common historical and cultural ties with the Middle East but it is oriented to the East like an 
envoy of the West with an advocacy of universal values and principles such as democracy, 
                                                            
21 Retrieved 6 September 2010, from   
http://unannanplan.agrino.org/Annan_Plan_MARCH_30_2004.pdf 
22 Ali Resul Usul, 2006, pp. 211-2.  
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human rights and rule of law. The AKP attempts to display a harmony of the tradition and 
culture with modernity and universal values. 
As a part of its advocacy of Turkey’s cultural and historical heritage rooted in Islamic 
civilization, the AKP took the mission of erasing the signs of Islamophobia in the west which 
has been particularly powerful after 9/11 events. Islamophobia is deemed as closely 
associated with reactions and attacks directed to the Muslims in the world in last ten years. 
For this reason, the party started a campaign and organized 2007 International Islamophobia 
Conference in Istanbul which was joined by very leading scholars and policymakers from all 
around the world. And similarly, the party has been strongly opposed to Samuel Huntington’s 
idea of Clash of Civilizations as a potential source of enmity and hatred among different 
religions. To this end, Turkey undertook the co-presidency of a UN Commission titled as 
Alliance of Civilizations in 2005 together with Spain to promote friendship, dialogue and 
cooperation among nations belonging to different religions, cultures and civilizations.23    
An important change in the foreign policy orientation of the Turkish religious right is 
the active participation of Turkey to the Greater Middle East Initiative started by the USA. 
The initiative is actively supported by the EU as well. The Greater Middle East Project has 
developed for the reformation of present socio-political and economic landscape of the 
Middle East. The project aims to settle the standards of democracy, rule of law, human rights, 
woman rights, economic and social development to be carried out in coordination with 
regional states. It is expected that the project will help to eliminate Middle East-originating 
terrorism, religious fundamentalism, illegal immigration etc. and will integrate the Middle 
East to the developed world politically and economically. Thus the USA invites the world 
community to participate in this initiative.24  
With its established secular democratic system and its active membership in regional 
and global international organizations, Turkey is expected to be a mediator between the west 
and the East in the application of this project as well as a model country for the Middle East. 
Turkey is praised with its ability to harmonize Islam and universal values developed in the 
West. The goals of the Greater Middle East Project display a great deal of similarity with the 
foreign policy goals of the AKP. Turkey thus supports the project fully for a more democratic, 
freer and a more peaceful Middle East. It is believed that democratic and economic 
development of the Middle East will make Turkey a global power. Turkey’s EU process is 
also in support of the Greater Middle East Initiative. The EU similarly promotes democracy, 
economic and social development in the region on which there is a transatlantic cooperation 
between Europe and the USA. In OIC Tehran Summit 2003, Abdullah Gül expressed concerns 
of Turkey about the democratic deficit in the region and urged member countries to take 
necessary measures thereupon. Accordingly, the Middle East was urgently in need of political 
reforms.25 
                                                            
23 Hüseyin Bağcı and Bayram Sinkaya, “Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi ve Türkiye (tr. Greater Middle East Project and 
Turkey),” in Zeynep Dağı, Ak Partili Yıllar (tr. Years with AKP), 2006, p. 109. 
24 Ibid., pp. 99-101. 
25 Ibid., pp. 101-111.  
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Turkey has benefitted from this meditative approach in various economic and political 
ways. In return for the initial support of the AKP Government for the US war in Iraq, Turkey 
is provided with economic assistance by the USA in form of $6 billion grant and another $25-
30 billion dollars of loan. In addition, the USA has been a keen supporter of Turkey’s 
membership to the EU with also breaking the insistence of the EU on the solution of the 
Cyprus issue prior to the start of negotiations for membership. And in its neighbourhood, 
Turkey helped Syria against a potential international isolation and possibility of a US assault.  
If we are to investigate Turkey’s relations with individual states in the Middle East, 
Iran, Syria, Israel and Palestine deserve particular attention as Turkey has become more and 
more involved with them over a variety issues and events. To start with, dynamics of Turkish-
Iranian contemporary relations have been shaped under the influence of a number of 
important events which include the Iran Revolution, Iran-Iraq War, alleged Iranian support to 
PKK and Turkish support to anti-Khomeini oppositional organization of Mujahedeen al-Halk. 
As a secular state with a Muslim population, Turkey was deeply concerned with the 
possibility of the spread of Iranian revolution to its own territories. This concern was, 
however, recovered with the emergence of Iran-Iraq War in 1980 one year after the breakup of 
the revolution to embroil Iran for the next eight years without letting it nurture a revolutionary 
agenda vis-à-vis its neighbours. In this period, Turkey was concerned with keeping away from 
the prospects of warfare by also securing economic gains through the sale of necessary staff to 
the warring states. During the 1990s after the end of the war, the relations were frequently in 
tension due to the claims that Iran was permitting PKK to use its own territory as headquarter 
and camps for their attacks to Turkey. And similarly, Turkey was accused of providing 
sanctuary to Mujahedeen al-Halk, an anti-regime organization aiming to overthrow the 
Khomeini regime in Iran. The relations were hottest when Turkey bombed some PKK targets 
in Iranian border villages in 1999 during which the two countries had come to the brink of 
war. But the tension was soon recovered with the signing of a mutual security treaty.26 
With the inauguration of the AKP government in 2002, Turkish-Iranian relations have 
acquired a multidimensional and multipartite character involving security matters as well as 
economic and diplomatic issues. The most important issue in the agenda of Turkish-Iranian 
relations was Iran’s ambitions for establishing a nuclear energy installation and uranium 
enrichment program. Turkey has been opposed to Iran’s nuclear ambitions together with the 
USA and the EU for a more peaceful and nuclear-free Middle East. For this matter, Turkey 
tried to be a mediator between Iran and Western countries to dissuade Iran from its nuclear 
program. While being opposed to a nuclear Iran, the AKP government has never been 
suspicious of a potential attack from Iran but rather believed in the value of historical 
friendship and neighbourhood between two countries. Turkey made pledges not to support 
any attack against Iran that may originate from the west.27 
In 2008, Iranian Prime Minister Ahmadinajat made an official visit to Turkey to meet 
with Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Under the shadow of Israel’s Gaza War and 
                                                            
26 William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey, The Case of the AKP, 
2009, pp. 139-41. 
27 Id. 
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succeeding similar events, it was observed that Turkey’s opposition to a nuclear Iran was 
softened and that Turkey was not against Iran’s production of nuclear energy for civilian 
purposes. During the visit, Ahmedinajat reiterated that Iran has no motivations for acquiring 
nuclear weapons.28  
In May 2010, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made a visit to Iran 
together with the President of Brazil Lula Da Silva for an agreement on the import of enriched 
Uranium to Turkey. Erdoğan expressed in a speech that Iran does not have any nuclear 
weapons and that it is rather surprising why the international community is so much anxious 
about such prospects while Israel possesses a stock of nuclear weapons. For global and 
regional peace, countries must be subject to equal treatment.29    
Another important issue between the two countries is Turkish import of natural gas 
from Iran. Turkey is diverted to Iran for the purpose of diversifying its energy import sources 
and for meeting increasing domestic demand. The volume of trade between two countries has 
increased from $1 billion in 2000 to over $10 billion in 2009. Most of Turkey’s imports from 
Iran consist of oil, natural gas and similar products. The volume of trade is expected to rise 
over $20 billion in the near future with increasing economic ties. Turkey has won a tender for 
the construction of a trans-border natural gas pipeline to transit the South Pars natural gas 
reserves of Iran to Europe through Turkey. In 2001, the natural gas pipeline between the 
countries amounted to 17% of Turkey’s gas import. In 2007, the AKP government negotiated 
with Iran for the construction of a second natural gas pipeline to transfer 30 billion cubic 
meters of gas in a year to carry Iranian and Turkmen gas at the same time.30 
Turkish-Syrian relations, secondly, were strained until the end of 1990s because of a 
number of reasons that include Syria’s claims over Hatay, Turkey’s South-eastern Anatolian 
Project and Syria’s support for the PKK. Hatay was under French mandate after the First 
World War to gain its independence in 1938. In a referendum held in 1939, Hatay decided to 
join Turkey which was opposed by Syria until recently. Turkey’s South-eastern Anatolian 
Project was a source of trouble in relations because of the Syrian claims that Turkey was 
reducing the flow of water to lower basins of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris. An finally, 
Turkey was condemning Syria for its overt support to PKK and its provision of sanctuary to 
PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Damascus. For these reasons, two countries came to the brink 
of warfare in 1998, but the tension was recovered with the dismissal of Abdullah Öcalan from 
Syria and his capture in Kenya to represent a turning point in bilateral relations. In 1999, 
Turkey and Syria signed the Adana Agreement that involved the cooperation of two countries 
in security and military matters.31  
In 2000, first time in the history of bilateral relations, Turkish President Necdet Sezer 
organized an official visit to Syria to join in the funeral of Syrian President Hafiz Assad to be 
followed by a number of other high level of visits by both sides. Turkey’s decision about not 
                                                            
28 BBC News, “Iran Nuclear Programme – Solely Civilian,” 16 March 2010,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8570842.stm  
29 Press TY, “World Should Focus on Israel’s Nukes,” 19 May 2010, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/126944.html  
30 William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, 2009, p. 141. 
31 Ibid., pp. 142-3. 
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supporting the US War in Iraq in 2003 was another important point in relations. The decision 
was highly appreciated by Syria which was also threatened by the USA due to its alleged 
support to international terrorism.32      
In 2004, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Hafiz Assad in Damascus to sign a 
free trade agreement reminiscent of Turgut Özal’s policies for the development of bilateral 
trade relations between the countries. Relations continued with increasing political, 
diplomatic and military ties in ensuing years. Two countries agreed in 2009 on the conduct of 
three joint military manoeuvre to further develop ties of friendship, cooperation and 
confidence and also to improve the ability of border troops to work in coordination. During 
the conduct of the manoeuvre, defence ministers of the two countries visited the 9th 
International Defence Industry Fair held in Istanbul and signed a letter of intent as a sign of 
cooperation in defence industry. In May 2009, President Abdullah Gül went for another visit 
to Damascus with a delegate of Turkish ministers that included Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Ahmet Davutoğlu after the invitation of Syrian President Assad in return for Assad’s visit in 
2007 to keep the bilateral relations at a pace.33       
Turkish-Israeli relations also showed rapid development since 1990s to the day to 
make Turkey a mediator for the start of peace talks between Israel, Syria, Palestine and the 
USA. This was particularly the result of Turkey’s new diplomatic style promoting peace and 
security in the region and developing relations with regional countries in a multidimensional 
and multipartite way. In January 1994, Turkey signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement with 
Israel to be followed by the signing of a Security and Intelligence Agreement in March 1994. 
In January 1995, another agreement was signed involving the training of Turkish special 
police forces and intelligence agents by Israel with their weapons and technical devices to be 
provided by Israel. These agreements were reached with the initiative of the Turkish Military 
Command rather than the politicians and thus must not surprise the beholder as they were 
signed during the Erbakan-Çiller Government. The protocols signed in these years constituted 
the major framework of military and strategic relations between two countries that involved 
Israeli supply of weapons and modernization of Turkish jets and tanks.34  
Economic relations between two countries have been developing rapidly with or 
without any political motivations. A free trade agreement was reached between two countries 
in 2000. The volume of foreign trade between two countries is over $2.5 billion currently. And 
there were future plans for huge pipeline project for supply of water, electricity, natural gas 
and oil to Israel.  
The AKP Government is most willing to become an agent of peace in the region 
between Israel, Syria, Palestine and the USA. The AKP Government has been very 
determined to bring an end to decades-old Israeli-Arab conflict since the beginning. The party 
pledged to improve relations with both sides of the conflict for its political and economic 
                                                            
32 Id. 
33 Today’s Zaman, “Turkey, Syria to Forge Defence Industry Cooperation,” 27 April 2009; Today’s Zaman, 
“Turkey, Israel Conduct Military Drill, Israel Disturbed,” 28 April 2009.  
34 Hakan Köni, “Turkish-Israeli Military Relations: Has Israel Blundered?,” Newzfirst, 26 August 2010.   
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interests. Turkey is leading the development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian industrial park for 
prospective cooperation for peace between the parties. Before the holding of the Middle East 
Peace Conference in 2007 in Annapolis, Turkey invited leaders of Israel and Palestine Shimon 
Peres and Mahmud Abbas to address in the Turkish parliament for the resolution of the 
conflict. Turkey’s good offices were appreciated by all parties and it was invited to Annapolis 
as a party for the resolution of the conflict.    
During the visit of Shimon Peres to Turkey, a set of other regional problems are 
discussed including the Iranian nuclear enrichment program, captive Israeli soldiers held by 
Palestinians, and the Syrian-Israeli conflict over Golon Heights. Peres expressed their 
concerns with Iran’s motivation to produce nuclear weapons and for the return of their 
soldiers and Abdullah Gül delivered the message for the start of negotiations between Israel 
and Syria. After Israel’s declaration to Syria that Israel is intended to return Golon Heights to 
Syria, official talks started between two countries with the mediation of Turkey to be met in 
Istanbul.35   
Despite the developing tone of strategic and economic relations between two 
countries, it cannot be said that the AKP declared its relations with Israel perfect. Major 
source of diplomatic and political problem between two countries remains Israeli violations of 
human rights and international law in Palestine and in its neighbourhood. Israeli occupation of 
Palestine and the Golon Heights, and the atrocities the Palestinians are subjected have brought 
bilateral diplomatic relations to a minimum in times. For this matter, Turkey supported the 
UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 calling Israel to withdraw from the lands that it 
occupied in 1967. Turkey condemned the assassination of Sheikh Ahmet Yassin by Israeli 
forces in 2004 as an act of state terrorism. In 2006, Turkish President Abdullah Gül met an 
exiled Hamas leader, Khaled Meshal, in Ankara during which he reiterated Turkey’s support 
to UN Security Council decisions for the rights of Palestinians. The meeting was expectedly 
not welcomed by Israel and the western media due to accusations of terrorist activities 
attributed to Hamas. 
Israel’s Gaza campaign in 2009 was similarly harshly condemned by Turkey during 
which the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan demanded Israel to stop the bloodshed 
immediately. And similarly, in World Economic Forum in 2009 held in Davos, Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed his anger to Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Perez for their 
killings of the Palestinians in Gaza after which he abandoned the meeting saloon. As Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan was not given enough time to speak, he interrupted to say that Mr. Peres 
spoke too loudly to cover his guilt. They know it very well how to kill. Turkish Prime 
Minister then stated that he will never come to Davos again.          
And Israel’s Flotilla attacks represented the most recent diplomatic and political trouble 
between two countries unprecedented in the history of bilateral relations. Israel stormed a 
humanitarian aid fleet organized by Turkish aid volunteers to break Israel’s military blockade 
over Gaza for the delivery of relief items. The Israeli attacks resulted with the killing of eight 
Turkish citizens and a Turkish-origined US citizen. Turkey immediately called its Israeli 
                                                            
35 Al-Jazeera, “Syria-Israel Talks One Year Old,” 22 May 2008, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2008/05/200861503620843768.html  
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ambassador to Turkey and closed the embassy in Tel Aviv. Turkish President, Prime Minister 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed their deep concerns and revulsion against the 
Israeli practice violating the Law of Sea and their attacks to aid volunteers.  Israel’s actions 
were widely condemned by the UN, EU and other global and regional actors. Soon after, 
Turkey declared that earlier military agreements for Israel’s use of Turkish air space and for 
the conduct of joint military exercise are cancelled.36           
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have tried to elucidate the major changes in the policies and goals of the 
Turkish religious right in the area of foreign policy from the National View parties of National 
Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party and Felicity Party to the 
Justice and Development Party. The major change in the foreign policy orientation of the 
party is explored in the shift from a predominantly cultural to a pragmatist and rational 
attitude. The National View parties had a vision of dichotomy between the East and the West. 
The East was belonging to the Islamic civilization and the west was shaped by Judeo-
Christian traditions for centuries and the history of the world was written over an adversarial 
competition between these two poles. The west was driven by the will to exploit and weaken 
its adversary. The east, on the other hand, had a mission of civilization rooted in its Islamic 
heritage and exemplified in the history of Islamic states that did not foresee the annihilation of 
the non-Islamic nor did it exploit them economically. It was a necessity of reason for Turkey 
to minimize its political links with western international organizations and actors such as the 
UN, EU, IMF, World Bank, USA and Israel and turn its face to the Muslim countries of the 
Middle East. Turkey had to lead the formation of alternative international organizations and 
entities in the Middle East as a source of power and development.  
 
The foreign policy vision of the Justice and Development Party is formed on 
substantially different premises than these of the National View movement. The notion of 
East-West dichotomy is abandoned in favour of a Turkey which has strong ties with the East 
and the West at the same time. The foreign policy decision making team of the AKP sees 
Turkey’s interests in integration with the West and East. The role of the religion is minimized 
in shaping Turkey’s relations with its neighbours and global actors. The party deems 
democracy, human rights, and rule of law as universal values of the humanity with their 
origins in the west and therefore it is strongly in favour of Turkey’s membership to the EU, 
active role in the UN and close relations with the USA and other global actors. The agenda of 
AKP Government’s foreign policy is occupied with all security, political, diplomatic, 
economic, humanitarian, social and cultural concerns that lead Turkey to pursue a 
multidimensional, multipartite, peaceful and dynamic policy in world politics. AKP 
Government’s relations with the Middle East is indeed even more developed than the one 
desired by the Welfare Party. Turkey’s powerful economy, stable political system, and secular 
democracy have been instrumental in its portrayal as a model country in the Middle East by 
the USA and the EU. With its pacific and conciliatory attitude and its close relations with Iran, 
                                                            
36 Hakan Köni, “Turkish-Israeli Relations in the Aftermath of Flotilla Attacks,” Newzfirst, July 20, 2010. 
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Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Israel, the AKP Government is also an oft-searched office of 
mediation for peace talks and negotiations in the Middle East.  
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